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The paper undertakes a cross-sectoral analysis of a salient empirical implication of the model 
of tacit collusion advanced by Abreu et al (1986). Specifically, the prevalence of a first order 
Markovian process for alternating between price wars and collusive periods is assessed by 
means of non-parametric tests. The analysis focuses on 30 different industries in Canada. The 
evidence provides weak support for optimal collusion in one industry, which is consistent 
with the idea that such collusive arrangements are unusual. 
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1. Introduction 
Tacit  collusion  is  an  elusive  phenomenon  and  game-theoretical  models 
provide  foundations  for  the  presence  of  multiple  pricing  regimes  [see  e.g. 
Jacquemin and Slade (1992) and Rees (1993) for overviews]. In a related vein, 
influential models by Green and Porter (1984) and Rotenberg and Saloner (1986) 
justify  price  wars  as an equilibrium phenomenon for  sustaining collusion,  which 
contrasts  with  Friedman  (1971),  who  postulates  an  infinite  Nash-reversal  in  the 
punishment phase of an infinitely-repeated trigger strategy oligopoly  game. The 
nature of price wars is dictated by the choice of punishment, the nature of shocks 
and the information structure that prevails [see Slade (1990), Lu and Wright (2010) 
and Knittel and Lepore (2010)]. 
The  main  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  further  empirical  evidence  on 
game-theoretical  models  with  embedded  price  wars.  There  is  precious  little 
empirical evidence of price-wars, and we extend the empirical literature by focusing 
on a cross-sectoral analysis instead of the typical single market examples found in 
the literature. We base our analysis on a non-parametric test first developed by 
Berry  and  Briggs-BB  (1988)  to  analyse  the  possibility  of  an  optimal  collusive 
agreement  following  Abreu,  Pearce  and  Stachetti-APS  (1986)  and  Knittel  and 
Lepore (2010). 
Specifically,  the  present  paper  considers  the  test  of  the  Markovian 
implication  of  the  APS  model  in  the  case  of  homogeneous  and  more  narrowly 
defined industries within Canada’s manufacturing industry. The application, based 
on monthly data, is appealing as we conceive criteria for defining price wars that   3
rely not only on the price variation of the product but also on price changes related 
to  (weighted)  input  components,  following  the  rationale  that  cost  asymmetries 
impact collusion [as in Ivaldi et al, (2003)]. Therefore, in contrast with previous 
studies, we investigate the consistency with game-theoretical models outside the 
realm of an explicit cartel, even though we expect an optimal collusive equilibrium 
to be relatively rare, even if one is generous in defining periods of price war. In 
particular, we undertake a large scale sectoral investigation and benefit from the 
availability  of  relevant  disaggregated  data  in  the  case  of  the  Canadian 
manufacturing  industry,  which  allow  us  to  consider  more  homogeneous  and 
narrowly defined industries. The paper is organized as follows. The second section 
discusses conceptual aspects related to the APS model and empirical criteria for 
delineating price wars. The third section presents the basic aspect of the BB test. 
The fourth section discusses data sources and presents the empirical results of the 
tests. The fifth section brings some final comments. 
 
2. Tacit collusion and price wars 
2.1- Basic conceptual aspects 
The model by Abreu et al (1986) extends the influential paper by Green and 
Porter (1984). A well-known signal extraction problem emerges given independent 
and  identically  distributed  demand  shocks  that  make  deviations  from  collusion 
difficult  to  detect.  Beyond  the  standard  concavity  assumption  on  the  objective 
function  of  the  firms,  an  important  assumption  of  the  model  is  the  monotone 
likelihood ratio property that indicates that the price distribution conditioned on the   4
aggregate output Qt is such that a smaller price is more likely to be associated with 
a  larger  quantity  Qt  than  a  small  one  [see  e.g.  Tirole  (1988)  and  Hajivassiliou 
(1989)]. The hypothesis is important to allow less restrictive behaviors than those 
prevalent in the Green and Porter model. 
The APS model legitimates price wars as an equilibrium phenomenon. In 
collusive periods firms will produce q
+ and will obtain a payoff of V
+ that refer to the 
best  element  on  the  set  of  perfect  symmetric  equilibria.  However,  if  one  firm 
observes a price below the trigger p
+, a punishment phase begins  where firms 
operating with q




 refers to the worst element in the set of perfect symmetric equilibria. 
Whether  an  industry  remains  in  the  punishment  phase  or  resume  the 
cooperative  phase  depends  on  a  second  trigger  p
—  and  if  p  >  p
—  the  industry 
remains on the punishment phase whereas collusion will be resumed if p < p
—. 
An important implication of the dynamic model of APS is that upon obtaining 
an  indicator  variable  for  prevalence  of  price  wars  one  can  justify  a  first  order 
Markov process and thus the probability that a state of high profits that prevails in 
period t depends only on the state at period t-1. Empirical tests on the Markovian 
hypothesis based on a non-parametric test is found in Berry and Briggs (1988) and 
encounters further applications in Briggs (1996) and Zeidan and Resende (2010). 
In  the  case  of  tacit  collusion  it’s  then  crucial  to  discuss  criteria  for  empirically 
defining price wars. 
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2.2- Empirical delineation of price wars 
The first wave of the empirical literature that deals with models that result in 
periods  of  price  wars  include  Porter  (1983),  Lee  and  Porter  (1984)  and  Ellison 
(1994), who sought to detect consistencies with game-theoretical collusive models, 
and  concentrated  on  the  well-known  Joint  Executive  Committee  cartel.  Later 
developments concentrate on other cases, with different methodologies to derive 
periods of price war, which are usually analysed by observing the market clearing 
prices  throughout  a  period  of  time.  The  main  problem  in  precisely  defining  the 
beginning and end of a price war in the present context is in to which extent a price 
decrease results from an undercutting of prices by firms with the sole intention of 
punishing deviation from a collusive period or in the other multiple causes that may 
result in a price decrease, such as fluctuations in demand, changes in productive 
capacity, costs shocks and firms’ strategic behaviour other than punishment for a 
collusive agreement. In the present case, since the theoretical model of Abreu et al 
(1986) in which we base our empirical analysis uses informational noise, any one 
of these reasons can raise the probability of phase transitions initiating a price war, 
but there is still difficult in translating the necessary indicator of a price war in the 
model to real data. 
The precise definition of a price war, in terms of duration and characteristics, 
depends on the idiosyncrasies of particular industries and the quality of available 
data. Morrison and Winston (1996) define price war in the aviation market as the 
situation in which the prices fall more than 20% in a quarter. The war ends when 
the prices go up, no matter by how many percentage points. Zhang and Round   6
(2011) use the same criterion, but they define the end of a price war in the situation 
in which prices go up by 5%. Ross (1997) uses a method of rank combination, with 
a statistical test to differentiate price averages between one quarter and the same 
in  the  preceding  year.  Busse  (2002)  uses  a  qualitative  criterion,  appealing  to 
periodical  articles  and  other  reports  that  indicate  the  existence  of  a  price  war. 
Borenstein and Shepard (1996) analyse accounting data, arguing that a pointer of 
prices war is disclosed by the price of the companies’ shares.  
Our sectoral approach uses data on industry costs and market prices, which 
means  we  cannot  use  approaches  such  as  Borenstein  and  Shepard  (1996) 
because  they  rely  on  firm-level  data.  We  do  have  some  qualitative  indicators, 
especially newspaper articles that show periods of price war in some industries in 
Canada during the period analysed. However, we rely on quantitative data rather 
than the qualitative approach of Busse (2002). This way, we will use a modified 
version of the Morrison and Winston (1996) approach, with the recognition that a 
methodology  based  solely  on  the  analysis  of  prices  and  costs  variations  can 
present the problem of specification and diagnosis errors. In particular, we consider 
observations on net price changes with respect to standard deviation benchmarks 
to indicate a regime shift - more details are provided in section 4.1. 
 
3. The Berry and Briggs Test  
Berry and Briggs (1988) and Briggs (1996) focus on an empirical implication 
of the APS model that refers to the prevalence of a Markov process for an indicator 
variable that classify the period as collusive or subject to a price war. The starting   7
point on the nonparametric test proposed by Berry and Briggs (1988) considers a 
binary series 
T
t t I 0 } { =  that represents a collusive state in period t if It = 1 and a price 
war if It = 0. The null hypothesis of the test refers to a Markov process of order K 
that is tested against an alternative hypothesis of a Markov process of order M > K. 
A useful summary of the test procedure is provided by Briggs (1996) and Zeidan 
and Resende (2010) and the current presentation closely finds the latter and more 
detailed approach. First, one should divide the series in terms of two sets 
M
i S , with 
i = 0,1, so as to construct a binary indicator variable It . In the present application 
we consider the case of a null hypothesis of a first-order Markov process (K =1) 
against an alternative hypothesis of a second order process (M =2). In that case, 
one needs to partition the series in 2
M = 4 possible histories at (t-1, t-2) as given by 
(0,0), (0,1), (1,0) and (1,1). A first-order Markov process means that state of the 
indicator variable in period t depends only on the prevailing state at t-1 but not t-2. 
Therefore, conditioning on information available at t-2 should not be relevant and 
conditioned to histories H
M that include the same history for K periods, one should 
have P(It = 1| Hi
M) = P(It = 1| Hj
M) under the null hypothesis. 
The  indicator  variable  It  ∈
M S0   can  be  conceived  in  terms of  independent 
essays conditioned to a given history. Thus a binomial distribution can be justified 
upon  a  Bernoulli  distribution  in  each  period  and  a  consistent  estimator  can  be 
based on the method of moments. Let  i t i S C I i N I
M
t / ∑ = µ  denote the proportion of 
situations where It = 1 given It ∈
M
i S  and Ni the number of observations in 
M
i S . It   8
follows that 4 sub-samples are considered for the test in the case of a first-order 
Markov setup. The sample mean provides a consistent estimator of the population 
mean   
0.  Similarly,  ) 1 ( i i i v µ µ − =   is  a  consistent  estimator  for  the  population 
variance v
0, where  i i i v Ni / ) [(
0 µ µ − converges to a standard normal distribution. 
In the case of a first-order Markov process, one should impose restrictions that the 
means are equal for the M-histories containing the same k-history, with R being a 
matrix with dimension 2
K(2
M-K - 1) by 2
M. Specifically, one should consider R 
0 = 0, 
where  
0 denotes the vector of means. Under the null hypothesis R  is normally 
distributed  with  mean  0  and  variance  RVR
T,  in  which  V  =  diag{v1/N1,  ...  v4/N4} 
stands for the variance matrix for   and (R )
T(RVR´)
-1(R ) follows a chi-square 
distribution  with  parameter  given  by  the  number  of  restrictions.  On  our  present 
application we have K=1 and M=2 and therefore the restriction matrix has two rows 
that are respectively given by [1 -1 0 0] and [0 0 1 -1]. In fact, they impose the 
restriction  that  for  a  common  history  at  t-1,  one  should  have  equal  means 
independently of the history at t-2 such that µ1 = µ2 and µ3 = µ4. The test statistic 
therefore follows a χ
2  under the null hypothesis of a first-order Markov process 
against a second-order alternative. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1- Data Construction 
The paper relies on monthly data for the manufacturing industry in Canada 
available from Canada’s national statistical agency (http://www.statcan.gc.ca). The   9
sectoral data is available at the 5 and 6 digits level in terms of North American 
Classification System-NAICS of 2002. We considered changes in prices to devise 
criteria  for  defining  price  wars.  Specifically,  a  proxy  for  net  price  changes  was 
considered as follows: 
∑
=
− ∆ = ∆
J
j
ij i w P NP i
1
) 1 ( j IP ∆  
where  ∆Piy  =  (ln  Pit  –  ln  Pi,t-1)*100  and  ∆IPit  =  (ln  IPit  -  ln  IPi,t-1)*100.  We  are 
considering,  therefore,  changes  in  prices  the  price  of  product  net  of  weighted 
changes  in  the  main  input  prices.  Data  were  sourced  from  CANSIM  Statistics 
Canada,  using  60  of  the  3206  tables  contained  in  the  database
1.  The  adopted 
criterion for inputs considers the J items that comprise at least 80% of the costs. 
The weight refers to the average cost share, since the cost shares show very little 
variation  during  the  period  analyzed.  The  sample  used  in  the  study  referred  to 
monthly data along the 1992-1/2009-3 period. 
The APS model refers to homogeneous products and thus it was important 
to select more homogenous and narrowly defined industries, what led to an initial 
selection of 30 sectors. In the present application we first consider a parsimonious 
criterion for identifying price wars. Specifically, we consider that a price war has 
started if a reduction of at least two standard deviations has taken place in period 
relatively  to  period  t-1  whereas  we  assume  that  the  collusive  phase  has  been 
                                                 
1 Examples include Table 281-0035 - Average hourly earnings for salaried employees (paid a fixed salary) (SEPH), including 
overtime,  unadjusted  for  seasonal  variation,  for  selected  industries  classified  using  the  North  American  Industry 
Classification System (NAICS), monthly; Table 329-0044 - Industry price indexes for primary metal products and metal 
fabricating  products,  monthly  (index,  1997=100),  and  Table  329-0046  -  Industry  price  indexes  for  electrical  and 
communication products, non-metallic mineral products, petroleum and coal products, monthly (index, 1997=100) 
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resumed  if  one  observes  an  increase  of  one  standard  deviation.  The  criterion 
would be even more appealing in the case of normality, though the assumption of 
normality  for  net  price  changes  was  untenable  in  26  out  of  the  30  sectors  as 
indicated by the Shapiro-Wilk test.  
The summary statistics and related Shapiro-Wilk tests are reported in table 
1.  
  
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
It is important to emphasize that optimal collusion equilibria are likely to be a 
rare phenomenon and we are yet proposing a simple criterion for defining a price 
war  that  will  generate  the  indicator  variable  used  for  testing  for  the  Markovian 
implication of the APS model. In fact, ideally we would prefer weekly data as the 
available  monthly  data  can  mask  part  of  the  price  variation.  Even  so  our 
conservative approach provides more confidence for favourable results that might 
emerge from the tests. 
 
4,2- Empirical Results 
The results of the tests for the selected industries are presented in table 2 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
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The evidence taking as reference a 5% significance level does not favour 
the  non-rejection  of  the  hypothesis  of  a  first-order  Markov  for  the  totality  of  
considered  sectors.  However,  marginal  evidence  consistent  with  a  first-order 
Markov process emerges in the case of plastic bottles (p=value of 0.086). 
Finally, it is  worth mentioning that we considered a robustness check by 
focusing on gross instead of net price changes. The evidence thus obtained was 
not consistent with a first-order Markov process in the totality of sectors and further 
corroborates the notion that collusive equilibria along the lines of the APS are likely 
to be uncommon. 
 
5. Final Comments  
The  paper  aimed  at  providing  a  large  scale  sectoral  investigation  of  the 
Markovian implication for a price war indicator under the Abreu et al (1986) tacit 
collusion model. Detailed monthly data on the Canadian manufacturing industry 
allowed  us  to  undertake  the  analysis  at  disaggregated  and  narrowly  defined 
industries. Moreover, the availability of input cost information was instrumental for 
defining and implementing a price war criterion that is the basis of the test. 
 The evidence indicated a marginal support for the Markovian hypothesis 
only in the case of the plastic bottle sector. There is some anecdotal on occasional 
prevalence  of  price  wars  in  that  particular  sector  [see,  for  instance,  Bauerlein, 
2009,  writing  for  the  Wall  Street  Journal].  Evidence,  even  marginal,  of  optimal 
collusion,  should  be  an  important  tool  for  market  regulators.  In  the  absence  of   12
explicit collusion or of the so-called “smoking gun” indirect inferences are worth 
being considered.  
Nevertheless, it becomes clear that more detailed data is still required and 
would include details on the informational structure prevailing in different industries 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
Sector   Mean  Std. Dev.   Min   Max   W  p-value 
Flour milling (31121)  -0.0001  0.0163  -0.0539  0.0570  0.9726  0.0005 
Vegetable fat and oil (31122)  0.0006  0.0235  -0.0758  0.0763  0.9934  0.4899 
Sugar manufacturing (31131)  0.0026  0.0172  -0.0462  0.0698  0.9713  0.0003 
Pulp mills (32211)   0.0008  0.0324  -0.1440  0.0857  0.9545  0.0000 
Paper mills (322121)  0.0006  0.0180  -0.0412  0.0944  0.9540  0.0000 
Newsprint mills (322122)  0.0007  0.0219  -0.0579  0.1087  0.9637  0.0000 
Paperboard mills (32213)   0.0009  0.0181  -0.0612  0.0798  0.9095  0.0000 
Paperboard container (32221)   0.0007  0.0120  -0.0405  0.0374  0.9724  0.0004 
Paper bag and coated (32222)  0.0001  0.0108  -0.0433  0.0423  0.9694  0.0002 
Synthetic dye (32513)  -0.0014  0.0231  -0.0604  0.0981  0.9785  0.0030 
Resin, synthetic rubber (32521)  -0.0009  0.0136  -0.0415  0.0522  0.9832  0.0145 
Fertilizer manufact (32531)  0.0041  0.0300  -0.1424  0.1104  0.9242  0.0000 
Pesticide and other agr (32532)  -0.0014  0.0159  -0.0566  0.0504  0.9660  0.0001 
Plastic pipe,pipe fitting (32612)  0.0003  0.0139  -0.0444  0.0631  0.9805  0.0057 
Laminated plastic plate (32613)  0.0003  0.0103  -0.0358  0.0321  0.9846  0.0236 
Polystyrene, urethane (32614)  0.0003  0.0113  -0.0573  0.0339  0.9571  0.0000 
Plastic bottle (32616)  0.0000  0.0099  -0.0285  0.0307  0.9936  0.5153 
Veneer Plywood (321211)  0.0001  0.0328  -0.1376  0.1389  0.9511  0.0000 
Wood window (321911)  -0.0007  0.0142  -0.0378  0.0456  0.9914  0.2625 
Wood container (32192)   0.0007  0.0150  -0.0494  0.0397  0.9909  0.2216 
Glass product manuf (32721)  -0.0007  0.0183  -0.0844  0.0697  0.9086  0.0000 
Cement manufacturing (32731)  0.0003  0.0153  -0.0694  0.0592  0.8934  0.0000 
Ready-mix concrete (32732)  -0.0001  0.0154  -0.0702  0.0473  0.9139  0.0000 
Concrete product (32733)  -0.0004  0.0162  -0.0693  0.0493  0.9359  0.0000 
Lime Manufacturing (32741)  0.0014  0.0176  -0.0794  0.0605  0.9100  0.0000 
Aluminum production (33131)  -0.0019  0.0460  -0.1364  0.1651  0.9808  0.0063 
Metal tank (33242)  0.0007  0.0149  -0.0491  0.0615  0.9475  0.0000 
Power, distribution manuf. (335311)   0.0014  0.0194  -0.0561  0.0814  0.9464  0.0000 
Battery manufacturing (33591)   0.0000  0.0123  -0.0654  0.0716  0.8935  0.0000 
Communic and energy wire (33592)  0.0000  0.0148  -0.0626  0.0606  0.9383  0.0000 
Note: the sectors are listed with the NAICS classification codes in parentheses   17
Table 2 








value  (1,1)  (1,0)  (0,1)  (0,0) 
µ  Var  N  µ  Var  N  µ  Var  N  µ  Var  N 
Flour milling (31121)  0.964  0.035  165  0.166  0.138  6  1  0  6  0.179  0.147  28  155.990  0.000 
Sugar manufacturing (31131)  0.976  0.023  167  0  0  4  1  0  4  0.133  0.116  30  7.00E+03  0.000 
Pulp mills (32211)   0.981  0.019  159  0  0  3  1  0  3  0.075  0.069  40  8.76E+03  0.000 
Paper mills (322121)  0.976  0.024  166  0  0  4  1  0  4  0.129  0.112  31  6.93E+03  0.000 
Newsprint mills (322122)  0.976  0.024  166  0  0  4  1  0  4  0.129  0.112  31  6.93E+03  0.000 
Paperboard mills (32213)   0.989  0.011  174  0  0  2  1  0  2  0.074  0.069  27  1.53E+04  0.000 
Paperboard container (32221)   0.99  0.01  193  0  0  2  1  0  1  0.111  0.099  9  1.85E+04  0.000 
Paper bag and coated (32222)  0.964  0.035  167  0.5  0.5  6  1  0  6  0.115  0.102  26  201.9113  0.000 
Synthetic dye (32513)  0.976  0.023  169  0.2  0.4  5  0.8  0.16  5  0.154  0.13  26  18.803  0.000 
Resin, synthetic rubber (32521)  0.965  0.034  142  0  0  5  1  0  5  0.094  0.085  53  4.40E+03  0.000 
Fertilizer manufact (32531)  0.969  0.03  161  0.4  0.489  5  1  0  5  0.088  0.08  34  354.631  0.000 
Pesticide and other agr (32532)  0.972  0.027  179  0  0  5  1  0  5  0.313  0.215  16  6.26E+03  0.000 
Plastic pipe,pipe fitting (32612)  0.977  0.023  172  0.25  0.433  4  1  0  4  0.12  0.106  25  188.206  0.000 
Laminated plastic plate (32613)  0.973  0.027  183  0.5  0.5  4  1  0  4  0.143  0.122  14  85.785  0.000 
Polystyrene, urethane (32614)  0.968  0.031  190  0.6  0.489  5  1  0  5  0.4  0.24  5  8.883  0.003 
Plastic bottle (32616)  0.985  0.015  199  0.5  0.5  2  1  0  2  0.5  0.25  2  2.940  0.086 
Veneer Plywood (321211)  0.985  0.015  196  0  0  3  1  0  3  1  0  3  Sing 
matrix  -  
Glass product manuf (32721)  0.953  0.045  149  0.333  0.471  9  0.777  0.172  9  0.158  0.133  38  24.215  0.000   18
Cement manufacturing (32731)  0.955  0.043  178  0.5  0.5  8  1  0  8  0.364  0.231  11  22.550  0.000 
Ready-mix concrete (32732)  0.967  0.032  183  0.571  0.494  7  0.857  0.122  7  0.375  0.234  8  7.179  0.007 
Concrete product (32733)  0.96  0.038  176  0.571  0.494  7  1  0  7  0.2  0.16  15  62.132  0.000 
Lime Manufacturing (32741)  0.972  0.028  176  0.428  0.494  7  0.714  0.204  7  0.267  0.196  15  8.9106  0.003 
Aluminum production (33131)  0.978  0.021  182  0  0  4  1  0  3  0.25  0.188  16  8.15E+03  0.000 
Metal tank (33242)  0.963  0.035  164  0.428  0.494  7  0.857  0.122  7  0.148  0.126  27  26.7109  0.000 
Power, distribution manuf. (335311)   0.978  0.021  186  0  0  3  1  0  3  0.231  0.178  13  8.51E+03  0.000 
Battery manufacturing (33591)   0.985  0.015  194  0  0  2  1  0  2  0.286  0.204  7  1.24E+04  0.000 
Communic and energy wire (33592)  0.973  0.027  182  0.25  0.433  4  1  0  4  0.2  0.16  15  64.816 
0.000 
Note: the sectors are listed with the NAICS classification codes in parentheses 